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What is driving HTA decision-making? Evidence from cancer drug reimbursement 
decisions from 6 European countries 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Background: Decisions on the reimbursement of the same cancer drugs are different across European countries, but 
empirical work on the reasons behind these differences has been scarce. The main objective of this paper is to make a 
methodological contribution to existing research, specifically by outlining the systematic process of analysis to address 
such questions and determining the factors that might lead to different drug reimbursement decisions, and to explore its 
application in the field of oncology. 
Methods: Reimbursement decisions on cancer drugs in six European countries (Belgium, England, Poland, Portugal, 
Scotland, and Sweden) between 2006 and 2014 were included in the study. A taxonomy was developed, comprising two 
groups of variables (system-level and product-specific) and an econometric model was specified (multilevel mixed-
effects ordered probit).  
Results: Only one in six evaluations in the sample reach the same reimbursement recommendation. Most health system 
variables were not determinants of a higher or lower probability of a positive reimbursement recommendation. However, 
the probability of reimbursement was higher when a drug was considered cost-effective by NICE/SMC and when there 
was a financial Managed Entry Agreement. This work also demonstrated a possible econometric approach for analysing 
differences in reimbursement decisions and contributes a structured approach for collecting and preparing data for such 
analyses. 
Conclusions: Drug reimbursement decisions can be analysed in detail along a set of factors that are related to each 
decision. This information is essential, not only for understanding why a particular drug is accepted in one country and 
not in another but also when trying to implement a new HTA system or reform an existing one. This analysis provides 
policy makers and stakeholders with a model that enables a better understanding of the factors that drive HTA decisions 
and is adaptable to answer similar questions. Moreover, the data collection limitations encountered and described in this 
work shed light on the need for greater accessibility and transparency in HTA systems and regarding HTA outcomes.  
Key words: Drug reimbursement, cancer drugs, Health Technology Assessment (HTA), Multilevel mixed-effects 
Ordered Probit. 
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Background 
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) is gaining importance because of the growing number of new medical 
technologies and limitations in health care budgets. All health care systems need to make choices regarding which 
services and products to pay for from public resources. As a result, most developed countries have HTA processes for 
informing drug reimbursement decisions. For the purpose of this work, drug reimbursement does not refer to the 
reimbursement of patients for costs incurred when purchasing drugs, but rather to the decision-making process in a 
country’s health care system that determines which drugs will be made routinely available to patients from public funds. 
In the last stage of the process, countries make different decisions regarding which treatments to provide (for a review of 
these processes see [1]). These decisions, which usually combine clinical and economic evidence with value judgements, 
are extremely important, not only to patients but also to manufacturers and health care professionals. 
Drug reimbursement processes have attracted attention from several authors. Various comparative analyses have been 
recently published describing a number of different national models [indicatively 2-10]. Moreover, a number of 
descriptive and comparative studies have specifically analysed reimbursement decisions [1,11-22]. However, few 
empirical analyses exist and they mainly focus on the UK or include few observations [23-29]. 
Differences in drug reimbursement decisions across European countries matter, in part because the clinical evidence 
reviewed is largely the same, and countries, while not of equal wealth, are of broadly comparable levels of economic 
development. As a result, one might expect broadly similar decisions (positive or negative) on drug reimbursement to be 
taken. However, this is not the case [e.g. 11, 15, 30]. So, why do these countries reach different conclusions? Modelling 
this question drives this paper. Our hypothesis is that these differences may partly reflect differences in HTA procedures 
across countries.  
This research tests this hypothesis using decisions on cancer drugs in six European countries for the period 2006-2014. 
This therapeutic area was selected because of the high level of public interest in these reimbursement decisions, and 
because many cancer drugs have been appraised thus providing a rich dataset.  
In a preliminary analysis [30], we tested a limited number of hypotheses that could explain the differences in cancer drug 
reimbursement decisions across ten European countries. While the results showed that HTA system characteristics, drug 
particularities and a country´s socioeconomic situation could explain some of these differences, a fuller explanation 
required further, model-based analysis incorporating a wide range of health system characteristics and specific 
characteristics of the individual drugs. 
Our aim in this paper is to meet these requirements and make a methodological contribution to existing research on 
determining the factors that might lead to different drug reimbursement decisions, especially on cancer drugs. For this 
purpose, a taxonomy was developed, comprising two groups of variables (i.e. system-level and product-specific), a 
dataset comprising the corresponding information for included decisions and countries was created and an econometric 
model was specified (Multilevel mixed-effects Ordered Probit).   
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Methods 
1. Developing a taxonomy of factors potentially influencing reimbursement decisions 
In order to achieve the goals of this research, we specifically designed a taxonomy to classify the characteristics of the 
HTA decision-making systems and outcomes of reimbursement decisions. To create this taxonomy, a detailed analysis of 
the drug reimbursement systems in six European countries was conducted (Belgium, England, Poland, Portugal, Scotland 
and Sweden). These countries were selected because they each have a well-defined HTA process, publicly available 
information on their drug reimbursement decisions and comparable possible outcomes of the HTA process. This analysis 
involved: 1) a review of policy documents and relevant literature from September 2013 to March 2014 [e.g. 31-34,1-6, 
12-15,23,24] and detailed examination of the websites of decision-making bodies in the study countries, 2) discussion 
with experts on related processes in each of the study countries from September 2013 to March 2014. In this second 
process, we primarily relied on Consortium members of the EU-funded project Advance-HTA (7th Framework 
Programme Grant Nr. No. 305983) representing some of the studied countries. 
We used insights from this analysis in combination with the Hutton Framework [31] to describe the drug reimbursement 
decision processes and inductively design the taxonomy. The aim of the Hutton Framework is to systematize the 
understanding of so-called ‘fourth hurdle’ systems using HTA. The term ‘fourth hurdle’ describes the additional 
requirement that a new drug has to demonstrate value for money before being reimbursed (on top of being of good 
quality, effective and safe, which are requirements for gaining market access). The Hutton Framework identifies two 
main levels of the reimbursement system: the policy implementation level (the system level) and the technology decision 
level (the drug level) [4].  
The resulting taxonomy adopts this division between system-wide and product-specific factors and describes the main 
characteristics of the drug reimbursement system in each country (organisational, process and method) and the main 
features of each drug (general and country-specific). Table I defines the taxonomy variables and Table II categorises 
them. The taxonomy was used to generate explanatory variables for the econometric model (see below).  
2. Creating the dataset for the econometric model 
The dataset for this study comprises cancer drug reimbursement decisions, analysed along the variables described above. 
The Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) was the starting point of our study because it appraises all drugs approved by 
either the Medicine and Healthcare Product Regulatory Agency (MHRA) or the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
The drugs selected were classified under “malignant disease and immunosuppression” on the SMC website. The list of 
drugs was validated by reviewing National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) decisions for any additional 
observations (especially on further indications for included drugs). This process produced 81 drugs and 161 drug-
indications (to account for multiple cancer indications of included drugs, as reimbursement decisions may vary for 
different indications of the same drug).  
This sample includes the technology appraisals for cancer drugs from January 2006 to November 2014 in the six selected 
countries (Belgium, England, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, and Sweden). The dataset was restricted to these six countries 
to ensure public availability of information and comparability of the possible decision outcome variable used in this 
study (see below). For example Germany and France were not included because the outcome of the HTA process is 
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different in nature from the other selected countries and Spain was not included because drugs are usually accepted into 
routine practice at the national level, but regions (“Comunidades Autonómas”) can impose variable restrictions. Drugs 
appraised from 2006 onwards were included since, by that point, many Europeans countries had introduced formal HTA 
systems and had started collaborating at European level. As some of the analysed drugs have more than one indication, 
we treat each indication as a separate observation in order to capture all possible differences in HTA outcomes. We 
considered 161 drug-indications per country, but decisions made before 2006 and decisions with missing dates were not 
included since there was no possibility of linking them with the time variables included in the model. 
Table III shows the data source for each country. For some countries, all decisions were publicly available through 
official websites, but for others, assistance was required from the National HTA Agencies or Health Departments, who 
were contacted via official contact points and/or the authors’ networks. Data collection took place between October 2013 
and December 2014.  
The dataset contains the outcome of the decision, the date when the decision was published and all the variables defined 
in the taxonomy. The decision outcome describes the final decision regarding the adoption of the technology. For this 
specific analysis, we define the outcome as Non-Favourable, Favourable with restrictions and Favourable. These are the 
three main categories of the HTA decision. To distinguish between “Favourable with restrictions” and “Favourable”, the 
decision is considered to be restricted only when it differs from the indication detailed in the marketing authorisation 
(e.g. when reimbursement is limited to a sub-population of the patients for whom the drug has been authorized).  
In order to capture all possible decisions, we included two further categories in the decision variable: Non-submission 
and Non-assessment. Non-submission captures decisions where the reimbursement body explicitly asked the 
manufacturer to make a submission but they failed to do so. This information is only documented for NICE and SMC 
decisions, as the other four countries do not provide such data. Non-submission is considered a Non-Favourable decision 
for NICE or SMC, but it was classified separately because this negative decision is the result of a different process. Non-
assessment, on the other hand can be the result of different circumstances, like the manufacturer deciding not to apply for 
reimbursement in the first place or the decision-maker not requiring the HTA agency to assess the drug. It is important to 
note the difference between the non-submission and non-assessed categories. Decisions categorized as either non-
submission or non-assessment were not included in the econometric model. Because the exclusion of these categories 
could introduce sample selection bias and endogeneity problems in the estimation as a result of using a non-randomly 
selected sample [35] further analyses (i.e. robustness checks) were performed (see below).  
Owing largely to data limitations, some assumptions were required in order to produce comparable data. If a country’s 
reimbursement process changed between January 2006 and November 2014, the same variable was recorded differently 
depending on the year considered (see online Appendix). For this specific dataset, this only applied to Poland. Some 
countries make re-evaluations of previous decisions (e.g. England) or they allow for a re-submission after a negative 
decision (e.g. Scotland). When a later decision changed the outcome, the latest decision for a particular drug-indication 
was included in the dataset. This was done to comply with our econometric specification of only one decision for each 
drug-indication and to account for the decision based on the most evidence and most recently applicable in the country. 
We expected a very small number of cases with this constellation, containing the potential bias introduced by this 
decision.   
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Finally, the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was not reported for each decision in each country. As a result, 
the best option was to work with an approximation of this ICER taking NICE’s ICER for each drug-indication (or SMC’s 
ICER if NICE did not report it). This does not assume that the ICER will be the same in other countries but rather that 
estimated cost-effectiveness will tend to be positively correlated across countries.  
3. Econometric Model 
The objective in designing the model was to determine empirically which of the taxonomy variables are associated with a 
higher or lower probability of reimbursement. Previous empirical studies [23-29] show evidence of a significant impact 
of clinical evidence and the ICER on drug reimbursement decisions.  
A multilevel mixed-effects model was chosen. A panel data design was not feasible given the nature of reimbursement 
processes, as there is one decision per drug-indication per country in a particular year as opposed to annual decisions 
[36]. However, the year of decision was considered to construct the time dependent variables (see below), as were time-
specific effects.   
Although the dependent variable (probability of reimbursement) is unobserved, it can be approximated for the included 
countries through a categorical variable corresponding to the final decision: 0. Non-Favourable. 1. Favourable with 
restrictions. 2. Favourable. Thus, the response (Y) cannot be modelled as a linear combination of explanatory variables 
plus an error, but uses probabilities instead. Relevant literature has treated the categorical dependent variable 
“reimbursement decision” as nominal [24,26]. However, it could also be considered ordinal since the “Favourable with 
restriction” outcome represents an intermediate point between “Favourable” and “Non-Favourable” decisions. In this 
analysis we treat it as ordinal believing that this specification allows us to capture more information regarding the 
decision outcome.  
The dependent variable Y can be considered as a latent variable , 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
         
While the latent variable  is unobserved, can be observed, 
 
assuming that εi is normally distributed (with zero mean and unit variance). There are two main options for specifying 
the model when the dependent variable is ordered: ordered probit and the proportional odds ratio model/cumulative logit 
model [37]. While both options account for non-linear distributions, the probit specification relies on a normal 
distribution of the error terms, while the logit follows a standard logistic distribution. For this particular case, we assume, 
for simplicity, the errors are normally distributed. As a result, we specify an ordered probit model. 
*
iy
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where  denotes the cumulative normal distribution. For all the probabilities to be positive the following restriction 
must be fulfilled, 0<µi,1<µi,2<1. 
Our multilevel mixed-effects model [24,25] can be specified as follows, 
 
where α denotes the intercept, β the coefficients, x a matrix of explanatory variables, e the error term and subscripts, i and 
j denote drug-indication and country.  
When using a complex design with multiple levels (drug-indication and country) and dimensions (spatial and temporal), 
there is important heterogeneity in the initial conditions (i.e. intercept). Failure to account for heterogeneous quantities in 
the model may introduce serious bias into the model estimators. In our case, heterogeneity can be controlled introducing 
random-effects in the intercept (αij) (varying at country level j and drug-indication i). In other words, the multilevel 
mixed-effects model involves clustering at country and drug-indication level.  
The year of the decision is a time effect that needs to be considered. Year dummy variables are used in our model to 
control for temporal dependency and avoid problems of serial autocorrelation (i.e. error terms in time series transfer from 
one period to another; the error for time period t is correlated with the error for a subsequent time period t+1). 
The original model included all variables from the taxonomy, some continuous variables to control for the principal 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of each country (incidence rate for each condition, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth and percentage population >65 years old) and the time-specific variables. However, there was 
correlation across variables and some insufficient variability in the categories of some categorical variables. Therefore, 
the t-test and the log-likelihood test were used to find the best model, with the final model specification being a multi-
level mixed-effects ordered probit [38,39]: 
 
where K= 0, 1, 2 (decision), i=drug-indication, j=country; and ηij denotes a linear predictor. 
For each observation, the linear predictor (ηij) contains:  
 
( ).Φ
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where t denotes years (2006-2014). This subscript appears in the linear prediction because some of these variables are 
time-variant.  
For the final model, some explanatory variables, mainly system-level, were removed or were regrouped, as they were 
irrelevant according to t-tests or were correlated with other variables. 
Under ordered categorical data, there is an important assumption to fulfil, namely the proportional odds assumption. This 
assumption states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories. This 
assumption is tested through the test of parallel lines (i.e. Brant test). For our specific model, the result of the test showed 
that the assumption was violated. One possible explanation is that the sample is not balanced; there is not a decision for 
each drug-indication for each country (i.e. not all drug-indications were assessed in all countries). To overcome the 
potential bias in the estimates, we followed the strategy suggested by Liu and Agresti [40] which entails fitting models 
for the separate categories taking into account ordinary sampling variability rather than relying purely on testing. As a 
result, instead of moving to a multinomial model, where the same problem with Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) would persist, a solution is to introduce some random-effects in the model specification. As noted above, our model 
has random-effects in the intercept, accounting for drug-indication and country. This approach improves the efficiency of 
the model. 
We used Stata 14 and the specific commands for Multi-level mixed-effects Ordered Probit (meoprobit) [39] to run the 
model. 
Results 
1. Size and composition of the dataset 
For the 161 identified drug-indications, our dataset comprised 908 observations; 23% of them were favourable decisions, 
while 12% were rejected and 17% were restricted. The non-submission category only accounted for 5% of the total 
sample. The remaining 43% of the observations were non-assessed drug-indications. There were 475 decisions 
(excluding the non-submitted and non-assessed categories) that fit our categorical variable of interest (favourable, non-
favourable and reject decisions). Table IV disaggregates the information by country for the sample of 475 decisions. 
Scotland and Belgium have assessed most cancer drug-indications, while Belgium, Poland and Scotland have the highest 
rates of restricted decisions.  
Analysing the dataset for the possible decision outcomes, we observe that in most cases the outcome of the HTA decision 
is different by drug-indication and country. Only for 1 in 6 (16%) drug-indications pairs were the decisions identical 
across all countries. This information confirms evidence of differences reported in previous work [e.g. 11, 15, 30]. 
Tables V and VI report descriptive statistics for the variables defined in the taxonomy. The outcomes of system-wide 
variables for each country are included in the online appendix. Table V shows the results of the categorical variables for 
475 decisions (favourable, non-favourable and rejected decisions). It also demonstrates that for some variables, such as, 
type of patient, disease stage, Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER), initiator, decision level, transparency, 
Managed Entry Agreement (MEA), some categories have few observations leading to their exclusion from the final 
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econometric model due to lack of variation. Table VI shows statistics on the continuous variables for the 475 decisions 
per country. The variables, except for incidence rate, are time dependent and range from 2006 to 2014.  
2. Insights from the empirical analyses 
Both the descriptive and empirical analyses carried out for this work, showed substantial evidence of different 
reimbursement decisions for the same drug-indication across the six countries. The results of the econometric model are 
shown in Table VII; variables that have a statistically significant effect on the probability of reimbursement are flagged 
with asterisks (*).  
Table VII presents two models, which include a different number of system-level variables, in order to see differences in 
the estimation. The number of observations for both models is 393. The drop from 475 to 393 is due to missing 
observations in some particular explanatory variables. As can be seen in the table, the reported likelihood-ratio test favors 
a mixed-effects Ordered Probit regression over a Standard Ordered Probit regression. Moreover, the Variance 
Partitioning Coefficient (VPC), which is 0.16 for Model 1 and 0.18 for Model 2, being different from 0 or 1, shows the 
relevance of the clustering. These results indicate the need to control for the different levels (country and drug-
indication) of the dataset and further highlight the relevance of the clustering. On one hand, the random-effect (i.e. 
random slope parameter) used to capture country heterogeneity is not significant. This result shows that the specification 
of the econometric model seems to be able to control for the most important differences across countries. On the other 
hand, the drug-indication random-effect shows significant variability. In other words, there is some relevant variation 
across drug-indication that the random-effect is controlling for. 
The results of Model 1 show that being in a system based on social health insurance increases the probability of 
reimbursement, while Model 2 shows no significant effect for the system-level variables. In terms of product-specific 
variables, both models find that a drug considered cost-effective by NICE/SMC or which has been introduced under 
financial MEA is associated with a higher probability of reimbursement. However, a higher incidence rate is associated 
with a lower probability of reimbursement.  
Regarding the time variables, Model 1 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship of GDP growth and 
percentage of population above 65 with the probability of reimbursement. For Model 2, these time variables are not 
significant. This finding can be due to the inclusion of the system-level variables into the model. Moreover, the results of 
the year dummy variables show a significantly lower probability of reimbursement from 2010 onwards. This coincides 
with the financial crisis from 2008 onwards, which introduced additional constraints for health systems reducing the 
probability of reimbursement.   
3. Model robustness checks  
The main robustness check was to specify the econometric model as a two-part model, which followed the initial 
specification, i.e. Multilevel mixed-effects Ordered Probit, in order to test for sample selection regarding the assessment. 
The first part of the model defines whether the drug-indication was assessed or not. The model is a Multi-level mixed-
effects Probit with a binary variable (0 Non-assessed /1 Assessed) with a set of explanatory variables that can explain the 
assessment decision (i.e. Evidence, Initiator, Economic Evaluation, Health system and Budget impact). The second part 
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of the model is the Multi-level mixed-effects Ordered Probit previously defined. The second part includes a variable that 
captures the predicted values of the model predictions of the first part (based on fixed effects and posterior means of 
random effects). The results of the model did not show any statistical difference for the second part (i.e. efficiency and 
significance did not change) compared to the original analysis. Moreover, the predicted values of the first part were not 
significant. In other words, the ordered model that we estimated initially is robust.  
We also checked whether the exclusion of non-submission decisions from the main analysis was appropriate. When the 
non-submission decisions were treated as non-favourable (rather than excluded) the results changed significantly and the 
model lost efficiency, confirming that these two types of decision are best considered separately. Furthermore, the two-
part model showed no difference when controlling for the assessment variable. So, selection bias does not seem to arise 
from the non-assessment category. Regarding the non-submission category, the model did not show significant 
differences from the main models. Finally, being aware that the Cancer Drug Fund provided patients with some of the 
drugs rejected by NICE, the models were run without introducing the NICE decisions. The results were similar to the 
main models shown above. Tables with the results of the robustness checks can be obtained from the authors on request. 
Discussion 
The main objective of this paper was to test a possible model for determining the factors that may lead to different drug 
reimbursement decisions across countries, providing insight on what drives HTA decision-making. This entailed 
designing a taxonomy, creating a dataset and estimating a Multilevel mixed-effects Ordered Probit. The dataset itself is 
also a contribution of this work.  
First, according to previous literature [e.g. 11, 15, 30].and our dataset, differences exist in the final reimbursement 
decisions across the six countries analysed. Second, the tests on the econometric specification showed that a Multilevel 
mixed-effects Ordered Probit was better than a Standard Ordered Probit, highlighting the need to allow for clustering by 
country and drug-indication. Moreover, despite differences in the final reimbursement decision across countries, the 
econometric specification was able to control for the most important differences across countries, as demonstrated by the 
country random-effect. 
The empirical results showed that a positive recommendation by NICE/SMC, a financial MEA or a SHI system are 
associated with a higher probability of reimbursement. Another result is that a higher incidence rate might be associated 
with a lower probability of reimbursement because, other things equal, it is associated with a larger budget impact. As 
with previous studies [23-26], the ICER is important for HTA decision-making. In particular, these studies and our 
results, show that a lower ICER (better cost-effectiveness) increases the probability of reimbursement. 
With the exception of the way the health system is financed (tax-based vs. SHI), no system-level variable was a 
significant determinant of the reimbursement decision. However, the possibility remains that differences in other 
variables, such as MEAs, which were significant, derive from or are influenced by system-level differences. Apart from 
that, the socioeconomic characteristics of the country show a significant effect on the reimbursement decisions.  
While the findings on cost-effectiveness and Health System are in line with the results from our preliminary analysis of 
factors influencing reimbursement decisions [30], the economic evaluation variable was not significant in this particular 
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model. Compared to the previous study, which did not include an econometric analysis, this work allowed us to 
investigate simultaneously the effect of different potential factors on the final reimbursement decisions.  
In addition, the results of the year dummy variables showed a lower probability of reimbursement from 2010 onwards, 
which coincides with a period of austerity measures in Europe. This result confirms the findings of our preliminary 
analysis, which showed that the global financial crisis is related to a lower probability of reimbursement [30]. Evidence 
of an increase in health inequalities from 2010 onwards, coinciding with the austerity measures, has also been shown 
elsewhere [41].  
The main findings have several policy implications. First of all, this research provides a model for better understanding 
the main determinants of drug reimbursement decisions. As a result, policy-makers will be more aware of the factors that 
drive HTA decisions (i.e. estimated cost-effectiveness, financial MEA, SHI system, incidence rate and socioeconomic 
characteristics). When introducing or reforming an existing HTA process, this analysis can help shaping its 
characteristics. It can also contribute to the comprehension of diverging reimbursement decisions across countries for the 
HTA community, including patients groups and health care professionals. 
Secondly, the data collection for this work, highlighted substantial differences in transparency and accessibility of related 
information in the different countries. Assembling the dataset for this analysis was both time consuming and 
complicated, as not all countries make their decisions publicly available or provide sufficient detail. We overcame these 
issues by contacting national experts who helped complete and validate our data. However, there is an overall need for 
greater accessibility to information and transparency in this area to improve all stakeholders’ knowledge and 
understanding of differences in HTA outcomes between countries.  
Although the results are satisfactory, during this research we encountered a number of challenges. In addition to the data 
availability issues described above, some assumptions were needed in order to combine all these data in a single analysis. 
Furthermore, while the price of included drugs would have been a useful variable for the analysis, related information is 
usually not readily available and only pertains to official (list) prices, not actual prices paid by health systems. Another 
important challenge was the model specification. We defined our dependent variable as an ordered categorical variable, 
necessitating the fulfilment of the parallel lines assumption to produce reliable results. While our model did not fulfil this 
assumption, we used the strategy of Liu and Agresti to address this problem [40]. Finally, in order to test for some of the 
limitations stemming from the data and assumptions in our work (i.e. sample selection bias and endogeneity) and validate 
our results, we performed a number of robustness checks. These increased confidence in the validity of the model.  
In this study, we have only looked at cancer drugs. Future research should also compare across therapeutic areas, in order 
to explore whether the type of drug is an additional determinant of the probability of reimbursement.  
Conclusions 
The aim of this research was to understand what is driving HTA decision-making and why countries make different 
decisions and set foundations for future methodology exploring such questions. The general conclusion is that drug 
reimbursement decisions can be analysed in detail and that there are a set of factors that are related to each decision. 
Significant associations with drug reimbursement decisions were demonstrated for a drug´s estimated cost-effectiveness, 
the existence of a financial MEA, a health system based on social health insurance, the condition´s incidence rate and the 
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socioeconomic characteristics of the country. This information is essential, not only for understanding why a particular 
drug is accepted in one country and not in another but also when trying to implement a new HTA system or reform an 
existing one.  
Another important conclusion is that despite differences in the final reimbursement decision across countries, 
documented in this study and in previous literature, the econometric specification was able to control for the most 
important differences across countries. The best model was a Multilevel mixed-effect Ordered Probit which showed the 
relevance of clustering at the country and drug-indication level.  
Thus, this research provides policy makers with a model that allows a better understanding of the factors that drive HTA 
decisions. The analyses highlight differences in drug reimbursement decisions across countries, thus improving HTA 
stakeholders’ understanding of these complex processes. Finally, the data collection challenges highlight the need for 
greater accessibility and transparency in the HTA systems in order to improve stakeholders’ understanding and 
knowledge of differences in outcome between countries.  
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Table I. Taxonomy 
1. System-wide variables 
                                                     1.1. Organisational  
Evidence Whether the assessment is produced or reviewed inside the body dealing with the drug reimbursement (agency) or, by contrast, this evidence is produced or reviewed by an independent body 
(outside the agency), for instance, universities, or independent committees. 
Body Independence The body in charge of the drug reimbursement is an independent scientific body or the government manages it. Moreover, if it is independent from the Ministry of Health (MoH), does it make 
recommendations or the final decision? 
Decision level This variable indicates if the decision and recommendation is taken at a national or regional level.  
Health System This variable collects whether the country health system is based on a Social Health Insurance (SHI) or a Tax-based system. 
 1.2. Process 
Initiator In most cases the manufacturer applies for reimbursement, however, in some countries, the initiative comes from the Department of Health, from the body in charge of HTA or it is an automatic 
procedure. In these last cases, then, the manufacturer is asked to make a specific submission. 
Stakeholders The different systems have a diverse degree of involvement of stakeholders. In some countries, they are fully involved in the whole procedure, while in other countries their presence is just 
limited to some comments at the early assessment. 
Transparency This variable indicates the transparency of the system, in terms of documentation publicly available, without taking into account the information of price negotiations. 
Appeal This variable records whether or not there is a formal system to appeal the final decision taken by the decision-making body. 
 1.3. Method 
Economic Evaluation This variable indicates whether an economic evaluation (cost effectiveness, cost utility or cost-benefit analysis) is required for the decision-making process. It can be that it is always needed for 
the assessment or that it is only required for some group of drugs (e.g. drugs which increase the therapeutic value) or non-required. 
Budget Impact This variable shows if a budget impact analysis is required for the decision-making process. 
Pricing location This variable indicates what type of institution deals with price setting (inside the Ministry of Health (MoH), external body or none of them, price set by manufacturer).  
Pricing decision The variable records how the pricing decision is taken in each of the previous cases. It can be a price negotiation, it can be based on referencing pricing or, by contrast, it can be set by the 
manufacturer in the submission and used for the corresponding calculations. 
Source: own construction 
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Table I. (Continued) 
 
2. Product-specific variables 
                                          2.1. General drug characteristics  
Type of patient This variable identifies whether the drug-indication is for adults, for children or for both. 
Orphan This variable indicates whether or not a drug is designated as an orphan by European Medicine Agency (EMA)1. A drug is qualified under orphan when it fulfils the following criteria (EMA, 
orphan designation): 1) it must be intended for the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a disease that is life-threatening or chronically debilitating; 2) the prevalence of the condition in the 
European Union (EU) must not be more than 5 in 10,000; 3) no satisfactory method of diagnosis, prevention or treatment of the condition concerned can be authorised, or, if such a method 
exists, the medicine must be of significant benefit to those affected by the condition. 
Incidence rate This variable tries to collect an estimate the number of patients for whom the drug is indicated. From the technology appraisals, it is not always feasible to know for how many patients are 
eligible for that drug in each country. This variable is approximated through the incidence rate. The information is taken from the age-standardised incidence rate per 100,000 for each therapeutic 
area and country2. For cancer, the incidence rate is disaggregated per type of cancer and country (GLOBOCAN 2012 project). 
Disease stage This variable determines whether the drug-indication is a treatment for an early stage or late stage of the condition. 
ICER This variable indicates whether the Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) determined by NICE is above or below £30,000 per QALY. When the drug indication has not been appraised by 
NICE, the SMC ICER is taken to define this variable. NICE generally performs a more detailed analysis than SMC in calculating the ICER, while SMC usually accepts the ICER identified by the 
manufacturer. ICER variable is not a continuous variable because of two main reasons. Firstly, NICE and SMC are the bodies that always document this value (transparency). Secondly, for 
simplicity, it is used as an indicator of cost-effectiveness (i.e. threshold from NICE). A categorical variable is able to show the relationship between cost-effectiveness and the probability of 
reimbursement, while a continuous variable will not take into account the specific criteria of cost-effectiveness. Moreover, this approach was taken because not all countries specified an ICER or 
another measure that account for cost-effectiveness.  
End of life  Was the drug-indication accepted by NICE as an end of life treatment? For the drug-indications assessed before 2009 (year of implementation of the criteria), it is categorised with another code. 
 2.2. Specific drug-country characteristics 
Managed Entry 
Agreement (MEA) 
This variable indicates the existence of a MEA during the decision-making process. A MEA is an arrangement between a manufacturer and payer/provider that enables access to reimbursement 
of a health technology subject to specified conditions. These arrangements can use a variety of mechanisms to address uncertainty about the performance of technologies or to manage the 
adoption of technologies in order to maximize their effective use, or limit their budget impact. This variable collects the different types of MEA: financial, performance-based or a combination of 
both.  
Alternative This variable shows whether or not there are alternative active treatments for this drug-indication already available in the positive list of each of the countries. It is not considered to be an 
alternative treatment when the comparator is best supportive care, standard chemotherapy or standard care. 
1  European Medicines Agency, Human medicines, Orphan designations. http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/general_content_000029.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac05800240ce. Accessed 30 September 2015 
2 http://globocan.iarc.fr/Default.aspx. Accessed 30 September 2015 
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Table II. Variables categorised  
 
SYSTEM-LEVEL VARIABLES 
 
Evidence 0. Internal (done inside the agency) 
1. External (review body outside the agency) 
Body Independence 0. Inside Ministry of Health 
1. Independent body only does a recommendation 
2. Independent body who decides 
Decision level 0. Recommendation and decision at National level 
1. Recommendation National / decision Regional 
2. Recommendation Regional/decision National  
3. Recommendation and decision National, freedom for implementation at Regional 
Health system  0. Tax-based system 
1. Social Health Insurance system 
Initiator 
 
 
 
0. Department of Health  
1. Manufacturer submission  
2. Body in charge of the HTA 
3. Automatic 
4. Both, manufacturer and Department of Health 
Stakeholders 
 
 
0. Non-involved 
1. Only comments at an early stage 
2. Involved but not in the final meeting 
3. Fully involved 
Transparency 0. Nothing 
1. Some documents 
2. Everything 
Appeal 0. No 
1. Yes 
Economic evaluation 0. Never  
1. Only for some drugs 
2. Yes, for all cases  
Budget impact 0. No  
1. Yes 
Pricing location 0. No negotiation (e.g. price set by Manufacturer) 
1. External body 
2. Inside Ministry of Health 
Pricing decision 0. Based on a negotiation  
1. Calculation based on price referencing 
2. Set by the manufacturer  
 
PRODUCT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
 
Type of patient 0. Adults  
1. Children  
2. Both 
Orphan 0. No 
1. Yes 
Incidence rate         Numeric variable 
Disease stage 0. Early treatment 
1. Late treatment 
2. Not specified 
ICER 0. Above £30,000 per QALY 
1. Below £30,000 per QALY 
2. Non submission 
3. Non data 
End of life  
 
0. No 
1. Yes 
2. Not determined (before 2009) 
 17 
Managed Entry Agreement 
(MEA) 
0. No 
1. Yes (financial schemes) 
2. Yes (performance-based) 
3. Yes (combination of both) 
Alternative 0. No 
1. Yes 
   Source: own construction and World Bank Data 
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Table III. Decision data by country (sources) 
NICE - National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; SMC - Scottish Medicine Consortium; TLV - The Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency, 
NLT - New pharmaceutical product therapies, RIZIV-INAMI - Belgium Health Insurance Agency; INFARMED - National Authority of Medicines and 
Health Products, IP; AHTAPol - Agency for Health Technology Assessment in Poland.. Source: own construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Institution/Dataset Data source 
Scotland SMC HTA decisions from the SMC website 
England NICE  HTA decisions from the NICE website 
Belgium RIZIV INAMI HTA decisions from the INAMI dataset (online). Validation of the 
data and information on MEA from the INAMI team.  
Sweden TLV / NLT 
 
HTA decisions from the TLV/NLT website. Validation from the 
TLV team. 
Poland AHTAPol Dataset created by AHTAPol 
Portugal INFARMED HTA decisions from INFARMED dataset (online). Information on 
the MEA from the INFARMED team. 
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 Table IV. Decision outcome per country1 
 
 
1 We considered 161 drug-indications per country, however, decisions before 2006, and decisions when the date was missing, are not 
included (no possibility of linking them with time variables). Source: own construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Scotland England Belgium 
    
Non-Favourable 32 (23.53%) 34 (22.82%) 4 (2.74%) 
Restricted 35 (25.74%) 20 (13.42%) 45 (30.82%) 
Favourable 24 (17.65%) 32 (21.48%) 66 (45.21%) 
Non-submission 36 (26.47%) 7 (4.7%) 0 (0%) 
Non-assessed 9 (6.62%) 56 (37.58%) 31 (21.23%) 
       
Total 136 100% 149 100% 146 100% 
 Sweden Poland Portugal 
     
Non-Favourable 5 (3.23%) 27 (16.73%) 7 (4.35%) 
Restricted 6 (3.87%) 47 (29.19%) 3 (1.86%) 
Favourable 34 (21.94%) 20 (12.42%) 34 (21.12%) 
Non-submission 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Non-assessed 110 (70.97%) 67 (41.61%) 117 (72.67%) 
       
Total 155 (100%) 161 100% 161 100% 
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Table V. Descriptive statistics: categorical variables (for 475 decisions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Category N (%) Variable Category N (%) 
Evidence Internal 378 (79.6%) Pricing decision Based on a negotiation 11 (2.3%) 
 External 93 (20.4%)  Calculation based on price referencing 159 (33.5%) 
Body Independence Inside MoH 44 (9.2%)  Set by the manufacturer 305 (64.2%) 
 Indep. Recom. 311 (65.5%) Type of patient Adults 455 (95.8%) 
 Indep. Decision 120 (25.3%)  Children 5 (1%) 
Decision level Recom./Decision National 339 (71.4%)  Both 15 (3.2%) 
 Recom. National /Decision Regional 136 (28.6%) Orphan No 357 (75.2%) 
Initiator Department of Health (DoH) 86 (18.1%)  Yes 118 (24.8%) 
 Manufacturer 242 (51%) Disease stage Early treatment 88 (18.5%) 
 Body in charge of HTA 11 (2.3%)  Late treatment 378 (79.6%) 
 Automatic 91 (19.2%)  Not specified 9  (1.9%) 
 Both, manufacturer and DoH 45 (9.5%) ICER Above £30,000 per QALY 242 (51%) 
Stakeholders Non-involved 11 (2.3%)  Below £30,000 per QALY 171 (36%) 
 Only early assessment 173 (36.4%)  Non-submission 39 (8.2%) 
 Involvement, not final meeting 205 (43.2%)  No-data 23 (4.8%) 
 Fully involved 86 (18.1%) End of life treatment No 230 (48.4%) 
Transparency Some documents available 11 (2.3%)  Yes 91 (19.2%) 
 Everything publicly available 464 (97.7%)  Not determined (before 2009) 154 (32.42%) 
Appeal No 105 (22.1%) Managed Entry Agreement (MEA) No 312 (66.4%) 
 Yes 370 (77.9%)  Yes, financial scheme 135 (28.7%) 
Economic Evaluation Only for some drugs 115 (24.2%)  Yes, performance-based 20 (4.3%) 
 Yes, for all cases 360 (75.8%)  Yes, combination 3 (0.6%) 
Budget Impact No 120 (25.3%) Alternative No 320 (68.1%) 
 Yes 355 (74.7%)  Yes 150 (31.9%) 
Pricing location No negotiation 211 (44.4%) Health system  Tax-based system 266 (56%) 
 External body 126 (26.5%)  Social Health Insurance system 209 (44%) 
 Inside MoH 138 (29.1%)    
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Table VI. Descriptive statistics: Continuous variables (475 decisions) per country and 2006-2014  
Incidence rate is fixed for the whole period. It only changes by country. Source: own construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean (SD) Min Max 
Incidence rate (all) 
Scotland 
England 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Poland 
Portugal 
 
443 
86 
81 
109 
41 
88 
38 
30.63 (35.06) 
29.89 (33.80) 
33.87 (35.39) 
38.26 (41.64) 
36.83 (45.29) 
20.28 (19.36) 
20.76 (24.55) 
1.60 
3.2 
3.2 
2.6 
1.6 
1.8 
2.3 
159.1 
95 
95 
159.1 
119 
94.2 
98.3 
GDP growth (all) 
Scotland 
England 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Poland 
Portugal 
 
424 
85 
79 
106 
36 
86 
32 
1.30 (2.29) 
              0.92 (2.3) 
0.47 (2.52) 
1.03 (1.85) 
2.4 (2.22) 
2.98 (1.37) 
-0.51 (1.91) 
-5.17 
-5.17 
-5.17 
-2.80 
-0.61 
1.57 
-3.23 
6.56 
3.43 
3.43 
2.88 
6.56 
5.13 
2.37 
 
Population > 65 (% total pop.) (all) 
Scotland 
England 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Poland 
Portugal 
 
424 
85 
79 
106 
36 
86 
32 
 
16.51 (1.49) 
16.62 (0.48) 
16.68 (0.47) 
17.27 (0.25) 
18.41 (0.68) 
13.91 (0.35) 
18.15 (0.36) 
13.34 
16.04 
16.04 
17.08 
17.38 
13.34 
17.46 
19.33 
17.49 
17.49 
17.98 
19.33 
14.43 
18.77 
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Table VII. Results of the model  
 
SE: Standard Errors, OR: Odds Ratio. Both models include year dummies. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05,***p<0.01  
Source: own construction 
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7. Annex  
System-level variables 
Countries 
/variables 
Agency Evidence Body 
independence 
Decision 
level 
Health 
system 
Initiator Stakeholders Transparency Appeal Economic 
evaluation 
Budget 
impact 
Pricing 
location 
Pricing 
decision 
Belgium RIZIV 
INAMI  
0 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
England NICE 1 2 0 0 0 3 2 1 2 0 0 2 
Poland AHTAPol 0 1 0 1 1# 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 
Portugal INFARMED 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Scotland SMC 0 1 1 0 3 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 
Sweden TLV 
prescribed 
0 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 2 
Sweden NLT  
hospital 
1 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 
 
     
Time changes: # 4 – before 2012 
Source: own construction. Validated by National experts. 
 
